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SECURITIES LAW
I. THE FOURTH CIRCuIT's NEW SECURITIES ANALYSIS MAY EXPAND
SECURITIES LAWS COVERAGE TO GENERAL PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
In Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc.' the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that interests in a cattle breeding program were invest-
ment contracts and therefore subject to the federal securities laws. The
court's holding is not surprising. The type of interests sold by the de-
fendants would be investment contracts, and therefore securities,
under the test of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 2 The court borrowed, how-
ever, analysis from case law formerly thought applicable only to gen-
eral partnership interests and blurred the distinct way in which courts
traditionally have treated these interests under the securities laws.
Plaintiff Bailey and four other investors purchased cattle embryos
as part of defendant Albemarle Farms' (Albemarle) cattle breeding
program. Because Albemarle designed the program to develop a supe-
rior breed of beef cattle, it priced the embryos above ordinary market
value. The investors also entered into management contracts with Al-
bemarle, which provided that Albemarle would select the cattle for
breeding, care for the cattle, and direct the sale of the cattle. The in-
vestors retained the right to cancel the management contract and to
direct the care of their cattle. This dispute arose when Albemarle can-
celed the breeding program.
3
The investors' complaint alleged that Albemarle violated the dis-
closure requirements of the federal securities laws. Albemarle moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that the interests purchased by
the plaintiffs were not "securities" under the federal securities laws.
The district court referred the matter to a magistrate to conduct dis-
covery on that issue.4 The magistrate found that the interests were not
securities and recommended that the district court grant Albemarle's
motion for summary judgment.5 After considering the matter de novo,
the district court adopted the magistrate's report in its entirety and
1. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
2. 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see T. HAzEN, THm LAW OF SECURmTES REGULATION § 1.5 (2d
ed. 1990).
3. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 919-20.
4. Id. at 920.
5. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 478, 495-96 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(mem.), rev'd per curiam, 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
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granted Albemarle's summary judgment motion.6 The investors
appealed.
The Fourth Circuit examined the practical limitations on the in-
vestors' ability to take an active role in Albemarle's breeding program,
including the need for coordination among the investors, and found
that those limitations rendered the investors "practically dependent"
on Albemarle's efforts. 7 The court rejected the district court's limited
approach and considered the facts and circumstances of the breeding
program, rather than focusing solely on the language of the contracts.8
The district court relied substantially on Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited
v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc.,9 in which the Fourth Circuit held that
general partnership interests are not securities. The Fourth Circuit
noted that in Rivanna Trawlers it was "unnecessary to consider
whether individual partners had the knowledge or ability necessary to
exercise ultimate control" because of the extensive involvement of the
partners as a group.10 Because the Bailey investors could not have
"meaningfully exercised" the rights granted to them in the manage-
ment contract and because they lacked knowledge and experience with
cattle breeding programs, the Fourth Circuit held that the interests
purchased by the investors were investment contracts.,1
The court's attempt to distinguish Rivanna Trawlers was unneces-
sary. Courts usually treat general partnership interests differently than
investment contracts under the federal securities laws. 2 The test for
determining whether an interest is an investment contract is the
Howey test. Under Howey an investment contract is "a contract, trans-
action or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party."13 As the district court recognized, the inter-
6. Id. at 479, 481-82.
7. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 924-25.
8. Id. at 925.
9. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
10. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 923.
11. Id.
12. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 478, 494 n.13 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(mom.), rev'd per curiam, 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Rivanna Trawlers, 840
F.2d at 241 ("[Oinly under certain limited circumstances can an investor's general part-
nership interest be characterized as an investment contract."); T. HAZEN, supra note 2, §
1.5, at 38-40 (stating that if the partnership agreement gives the investor actual control,
the transaction is not governed by securities laws; it is governed by the common law of
fraud).
13. SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). The requirement that the
investor expect profits "solely" from the efforts of others has been relaxed. Bailey, 904
F.2d at 920 n.3; see also Bailey, 703 F. Supp. at 479 n.1 ("[I]t is fair to gloss this require-
ment with the adverb 'largely.' ").
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SECURITIES LAW
ests at issue in Bailey easily met the first two parts of the Howey test.
The case turned on whether the facts supported a conclusion that the
investors intended to profit largely from the efforts of others.1'4 Courts
have developed a control test to determine whether the investor re-
tained the right to exercise sufficient control to significantly impact on
profits or instead relied on the efforts of others.'
5
In applying the control test, the district court examined the
Rivanna Trawlers court's formulation of the test. The court stated
that the Rivanna Trawlers court's "explication of the third prong in
Howey is. . . controlling," but then said that the court "is well aware
of the structural differences between the commercial venture described
[in Rivanna Trawlers] and the venture in the present matter."'16 The
magistrate adopted the Rivanna Trawlers court's approach of limiting
its examination to only the contractual language, but stated that the
court "clearly approached the question of control from a far different
perspective. 1' 7 The magistrate further noted that "[i]nvestors in gen-
eral partnerships historically have legal 'control over significant deci-
sions of the enterprise.' "I's The magistrate therefore suggested that
courts should borrow from the general partnership analysis under
Rivanna Trawlers to limit the control test to an objective inquiry. The
district court adopted the magistrate's report in its entirety. 9
Although a more limited approach to the inquiry may have ap-
pealed to the magistrate and the district court, such an approach
would clearly undermine the purpose of the federal securities laws,
which is to promote "'full disclosure of information necessary to in-
formed investment decisions.' ",20 The Fourth Circuit erred by not
openly rejecting the district court's approach and by not reemphasizing
the necessity of a broad inquiry into control under the third prong of
Howey. Instead, the court attempted to distinguish Rivanna Trawlers
without addressing the obvious differences between the investment
contract offered by Albemarle and the general partnership interests
purchased in Rivanna Trawlers. The court's analysis could lead to de-
struction of the distinction between the treatment of securities and
general partnership interests under the federal securities laws.
The Bailey dictum could lead to the use of an individual analysis
14. Bailey, 703 F. Supp. at 480.
15. See id. (citing Rivanna Trawlers, 840 F.2d at 240-41).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 494.
18. Id. at 494 n.13 (quoting Rivanna Trawlers, 840 F.2d at 240).
19. Id. at 482.
20. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963))).
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rather than a group analysis to determine whether the partners exer-
cised sufficient control over the partnership such that their interests
are deemed general partnership interests, which are beyond the scope
of the federal securities laws. This shift in focus would unnecessarily
broaden the scope of inquiry beyond that necessary to examine the ec-
onomic realities of a transaction. 21 A post-transaction analysis of each
individual investor may create a system under which an interest may
be either a security or a general partnership interest, depending upon
the characteristics of the investor rather than the characteristics of the
transaction or the language of the agreement. The type of individual
analysis suggested by the Bailey opinion is inappropriate for general
partnership interests. Moreover, the Rivanna Trawlers court rejected
such an approach.22 An individual inquiry "would undercut the strong
presumption that an interest in a general partnership is not a secur-
ity. '23 The Rivanna Trawlers court found this potential result unac-
ceptable and emphasized that "it is also important to bear in mind
that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide
a federal remedy for all common law fraud.
'24
An individual analysis is also inappropriate because of the dra-
matic differences in the stiucture, individual control, and individual
liability between general partnerships and limited partnerships. 25 Gen-
eral partners are jointly and severally liable for wrongful acts of any of
the partners and jointly liable for all debts and obligations of the part-
nership.28 However, limited partners are not personally liable for the
obligations of the partnership. 27 To prevent general partners from es-
caping individual liability by merely calling their interests limited
partnership interests, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA) provides a standard for determining whether the partners
exercise sufficient control to qualify as general partners. 28 The RULPA
clearly establishes the relationship between control and liability among
general partners and limited partners. Because general partners have
personal liability for the obligations of the partnership, they are natu-
rally inclined to exercise their statutory and contractual powers of con-
21. Rivanna Trawlers, 840 F.2d at 241 n.7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 241 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982)); see also id. at
242 ("[T]he securities laws were not intended to be a substitute for state fraud
actions.").
25. Investment programs and limited partnership interests traditionally have been
treated similarly under the securities laws. T. HAZEN, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 38-40.
26. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 13-15, 6 U.L.A. 163-74 (1914).
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trol and supervision. If a partner chooses to remain passive, this choice
alone cannot convert a general partnership interest into a security.
29
Therefore, the protection of the federal securities laws is not normally
necessary or appropriate for a general partner.
The Fourth Circuit also looked to partnership rights under Vir-
ginia law for additional evidence of access to information. ° Because
access to information is guaranteed by the law, a partner could easily
obtain sufficient knowledge to exercise control. Thus, the knowledge
requirement appears to be satisfied. The court does not, however, sug-
gest a method by which a court can examine the required ability of
each investor to exercise control, except perhaps by the use of empiri-
cal evidence. Additionally, the court's reliance on Virginia partnership
law is a bit meaningless. Virginia has adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act.3' Virtually all American jurisdictions have some version of the
Uniform Partnership Act. 2 Therefore, investors in Virginia partner-
ships are not accorded any special rights.
If the Fourth Circuit intended to adopt a broader scope of inquiry
into general partnership transactions, the standard by which the courts
would judge the facts of each case is unclear. The court stated that
courts must determine whether each individual investor possesses
knowledge and ability to exercise control, but excused the Rivanna
Trawlers court's failure to investigate because of the "structure and
protection" of the partnership agreement. 3 Issuers of general partner-
ship interests cannot be sure whether they must meet an individual or
group standard or how to comply with the standard. The court should
articulate meaningful guidelines before it expects compliance.
In Bailey the court reached the right result for the wrong reason.
The result is correct because the interests in the cattle breeding pro-
gram constituted securities under the traditional Howey test. However,
courts should not read Bailey for the proposition that general partner-
ship agreements should be subjectively examined beyond the scope of
the contractual language or that an individual control analysis should
be applied to general partners.
Lee Ann Anderson
29. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-41
(4th Cir. 1988).
30. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 923 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
31. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43 (1989).
32. See UNI. PARTNERSHIP AcT Table of Jurisdictions, 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1990).
33. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 923.
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